There seems to be an emerging consensus among the YouTube commentators who are particularly inflential in shaping US/advanced economy perceptions among anti-globalists and other US hegemony skeptics and oppents. Many are coming to the position articulated early by Mark Sleboda, who has been the most accurate in projecting the pace of the conflict, that Russia would have to take all of Ukraine, if nothing else because NATO officials and key EU political leaders have regularly and rabidly maintained that they will arm/rearm Ukraine even in the event of an apparent defeat. So the only secure and durable remedy to that, from the Russian side, is to make sure no US/NATO/EU-aligned Ukraine survives the war. That in turn would seem to require that Russia secures all of Ukraine’s current territory, by some combination of securing votes in the Russia-receptive oblasts to join Russia plus occupation or installatiom of a friendly regime in rump Ukraine. While I am in no position to observe directly, the tone of commentary supports the idea that Russian citizens more and more favor aggressive prosecution of the conflict, has been frustrated with Putin’s dalliances with Trump, and subduing/controlling all of Ukraine.
Even though occupying or otherwise dominatinng the entirety of Ukraine would entail more costs than other solutions, it is arguably the least bad result for Russia. But even so, Mark Sleboda has warned that that outcome might not be unwelcome form of Russia victory to the West: “We’ll make you choke on it.”
But even in this “subjugate all of Ukraine” assumption, there are a lot of ways to skin that cat. John Mearshimer has long argued that what Russia wants as an end-state is a dysfunctional rump Ukraine. That presumably includes Russia taking historically Russia-leaning Odessa1 to render what is left of Ukraine landlocked.
John Helmer has so far provided the most insight, due to his contacts in the General Staff, as to what the end game might look like. Helmer has suggested that the General Staff in particular has been frustrated with Putin apparently requiring a particularly slow grind on the ground, and holding back (until recently) on the prosecution of the electricity war. Admittedly that has become an easier task with Ukraine now almost entirely bereft of air defense capability even as Russia has increased its stocks of missiles and drones.
Helmer early on described how one element of the Russian strategy was to push determined Ukraine nationalists out of the county. Rolling westward deliberately rather than rapidly would help with that aim, particularly given that the population might still accept the Ukraine rather than the Russian view of how well Ukraine was holding out, plus people understandably are very reluctant to abandon their homes and commuities. Note that that aim has already been achieved to some degree, via emigration as well as war deaths. I saw estimates about a year ago of Ukraine’s population having fallen to as low as 20 million versus a pre-war level of ~43 million. Admittedly that factors in the loss of the Donbass. I can’t imagine that the true total is better now.
Not only does driving the neo-Nazis out in theory reduce the size of a terrorist rearguard, but on a more mundane level, it will result in more of the remaining population being Russia-tolerant and thus legitimately voting to join Russia. This will presumably result in more oblasts joining Russia than earlier voting maps of which areas favored Russia-friendly candidates would suggest.
In addition, Helmer pointed out that the General Staff expected that aggressive prosecution of the electricity war (as in turning out the lights, which would also result in no heat and destruction of infrastructure via burst pipes; key parts of the municipal waterworks depend on electric controls and heating) would produce a humanitarian crisis and mass flight westward. Helmer did make clear that the General Staff saw overloading border states with refugees was a plus, but Putin presumably does not like the optics of punishing civilians. That suggests that the Russian will create intermittent but somewhat lengthy outages (a guesstimate is 12 to 72 hours) to give the citizenry a taste of what is in store and give them time to leave in a more orderly manner.
However, I have not seen much consideration of what measures Russia can take to reduce the incidence of terrorism in rump Ukraine and the Russian Federation, not just the newly-integrated oblasts but pre-war Russia. MI6 lives for this sort of operation. Scott Ritter has claimed that Russia House, the CIA unit tasked to messing with Russia, is effectively a rogue operation. Even the formidabe torture enthusiast Gina Haspel was unable to get it back under control. So even if the US officailly retreats to sulk and lick its wounds after a Ukraine defeat, it seems a certainty that UK and US intelligence operators will instigate violence.
A final point that seems overlooked in a lot of commentary on the future of Ukraine is that, given foreign pot-stirrers, it isn’t necessary to have much if any die-hard Banderites to man these operations. John Kirakou, who had been the CIA’s Chief of Counterterrorist Operations in Pakistan, has repeatedly described his findings from interviews of Al-Quaeda operatives the US had captured. Without exception, they were not ideologues. They were desperately poor and the Al-Quaeda pay and death benefits to families were generous. Russia surely must have taken note of this risk after Turkiye/Western aligned forces were able to buy off the desititute member of the Syrian army, leading to a very speedy collapse when invaders rolled in.
Thus the John Mearsheimer notion that Russia wants to make rump Ukraine into a failed state would seem to play into schemes to foment terrorism unless “failed state” meant “very seriously depopulated”. Recall we have suggested that Russia could de-electrify Western Ukraine ex Kiev and say Lvov, and reduce it to the level of the Unorganized Territory of Maine. That regions has extremely low population density and its denizens are hardy survivalists often described by Mainers as “men with beards.” But that part of Ukraine also has rich agricultural land, which would argue against letting it go wild.
So it would seem that Russia either needs to largely vacate the sections of Ukraine that will not have a Russia-friendly post-war population, or assure that it is sufficiently prosperous so as not to serve as a fertile area for hired terrorists.
Perhaps there is an active debate in Russian circles on this issue, but Helmer’s latest post suggests that the General Staff is not alive to this risk. From his The Three Stages of the Trump War Begin with the Fifth Column:
A source in a position to know says: “The rate of east-to-west Ukrainian migration will accelerate and there will be disintegration of the frontline with a breakthrough on any one of the critical axes that will undermine the entire Ukrainian defence east of the Dnieper. Ouster of [Vladimir] Zelensky and [Andrei] Yermak will follow when the Ukrainian commanders cannot order their forces to continue fighting, holding their ground. There will be Russian satisfaction with the new regional lines and the depth of the demilitarized zone westward to Kiev. Of course, Banderite terrorism will continue, but so will the electric war strikes, as well as assassinations from the Russian side in reply. The rump Ukraine will be dysfunctional to the point where day-to-day survival will trump warfighting in terms of allocation of resources.”
That’s small “t” trump meaning defeat. “There’s no need for the Russians to declare that they are done fighting – the situation speaks for itself. The declaration that matters is that the winner is confident the opponent will never get up again.”
Admittedly this is one source, who is repeated a vision of the future that Helmer set forth from his General Staff sources early in the electircity war, of a very wide de-militarized zone (the width determined by the longest-range Western missiles that had or could operate in theater, now presumably the Taurus at 500 kilometers). Note this source sees Russia as not taking control of Kiev.
But what this contact sets forth is essentially an unending low-level war against rump Ukraine, with at least occasional electric grid strikes.
One would assume that the shape of post-war Ukraine is coming increasingly into focus in political and military circles, as well as in the pundit classes that can influence their views. And there is still likely some path dependency in what comes next. For instance, it may make a difference, for instance, if Zelensky and others in his inner circle decamp to form a government in exile, as opposed to being expelled from office or executed.
As we’ve indicated above, doing what Russia can to minimize long-term terrorism risks would been to be a boundary condition. My readinng of what is admittedly one view (and that view may represent only one faction in the General Staff) says that risk is not given enough creedence, unless the plan is to continue low-level operations in rump Ukraine on an open-ended basis.
I am hampered by not being able to read Russian sources or even the Russian press on a regular basis. Readers who keep on top of the Russian media, Telegram, and think tank output are very much encouraged to speak up.
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1 This idea is not as popular in Russia as one might assume, despite the role of Odessa in Russian history. It’s seen as fabulously corrupt and crime ridden, even by Ukrainian standards.
