Yves here. This detailed account of the making and unmaking of Yugoslavia may seem a bit overwhelming. But it isn\u2019t clear whether outsiders can understand how events played out without considering the very complex history of the ethnic groups in the region. One part of the story that was new to me was the last ditch (1989-1991) effort to preserve Yugoslavia and why it failed.<\/p>\n
By Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic, Ex-University Professor, Research Fellow at Centre for Geostrategic Studies<\/a>, Belgrade, Serbia<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n The First Yugoslavia (1918\u20121941)<\/strong><\/p>\n In retrospect, one outsider may state that the creation of Yugoslavia was triggered by the bloody assassination at Sarajevo, on June 28th<\/sup>, 1914, when \u201cSerb\u201d Gavrilo Princip[1]<\/a>\u00a0 killed (purposely) Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand (heir to the throne) and (accidentally) his wife, Sofia. According to Austrian-Hungarian authorities, the massacre was a part of the project by official Belgrade to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Kingdom of Serbia, designed in the heads of Serbia\u2019s secret military circle in Belgrade and driven by the desire of the Serbs behind the River of Drina (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia) to live in a united Serbian state.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n In fact, the mastermind of this secret project, the \u201cBlack Hand\u201d Serbia\u2019s secret organization of the military officers (persecuted by the Serbian Government and military authorities for their terrorist intentions), whose slogan was \u201cUnification or Death\u201d, was a mid-officer in Serbian army, Dragutin Dimitrijevi\u0107-Apis (the ethnic Vlach from Serbia), who organized the infamous assassination of Serbian royal couple (King Alexander and Queen Draga Ma\u0161in) in Belgrade, in June 1903.[3]<\/a> Nevertheless, the 1914 Sarajevo Assassination triggered WWI, which cost Serbia half of its male population, but initiated what Serbian nationalists were up to \u2013 unification of all Serbs in the Balkans into a single, common state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, later named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (in 1929).[4]<\/a>One of the prominent plotters in the \u201cYoung Bosnian\u201d movement (the organization guilty for the Sarajevo Assassination), which organized the massacre in Sarajevo in June 1914, was a Bosnian Serb, Vasa \u010cubrilovi\u0107, who became a prominent university professor in Belgrade after the war.[5]<\/a> Yugoslavia, in different political-economic forms and names, lasted for 70 years (1918\u22121941 and 1945\u22121991), about the average age of its citizens. According to some researchers, its disintegration was triggered by another bloody massacre, which in the army casern at Para\u0107in in Serbia, in 1987, was committed by an ethnic-Albanian from Kosovo \u2013 Aziz Keljmendi.<\/p>\n Contrary to buildings, which are difficult to erect but easy to destroy, forming a new state appears easier than dismantling it. The interwar Yugoslav state (1918\u20121941) had two official names: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918\u20121929) and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929\u20121941). The so-called royal Yugoslavia (the first Yugoslavia) was created as an agreement between Slovenian, Croat, and Serb politicians, including Montenegrin ones (the Montenegrins, however, have always considered themselves as the ethnic Serbs from Montenegro until 1945). The Macedonians and the majority of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population were considered by Serbian academics and politicians to be the Serbs as well. In November 1918, 2\/3 of Bosnian-Herzegovinian counties declared their unification with the Kingdom of Serbia. This fusion of various Slavic parts of the Western Balkans was not an easy task, but was carried out without many troubles. At least, it seemed so after the constitution was effectuated on June 28th<\/sup>, 1921 (the Vidovdan constitution). The new Yugoslav post-WWI state numbered around 11.900.000 inhabitants with a state territory of 248.000 square km. The final state borders were fixed by the peace treaties signed in 1919 and 1920.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n Nevertheless, it is of extreme importance to stress here that the initiative for forming a common Yugoslav state came from outside Serbia, in particular from the Croats, who used to live in the former Austria-Hungary, having essentially lost their independence in 1102 (to the Kingdom of Hungary).[7]<\/a> The advantage of the constituent nations was that they were all Slavs, except for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Western Macedonia, Hungarians in Vojvodina, and some other \u201cminorities\u201d (Gypsies\/Roma, Germans, Turks, Slovaks, Vlahs, Jews\u2026). However, the disadvantage was the numeric proportion, which was approximately as follows: Serbs: Croats: Slovenians (Slovenes) = 4:2:1. This appears to be the worst proportion, for the more numerous populations may treat the half-numerous one either as \u201cminority\u201d, or \u201con equal footing\u201d. Thus, no problems arose between Serbs and Slovenians, but Croats appeared \u201csandwiched\u201d between both populations. The tension between the Croats and Serbs will turn out to be a constant in the new state, both before and after WWII. Nonetheless, in the interwar Yugoslav state, there were recognized only three ethnic nations: Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The official political ideology and cultural politics were framed within the idea of \u201cintegral Yugoslavism\u201c.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n Both the King (Montenegrin) Alexander Kara\u0111or\u0111evi\u0107 (1888\u22121934) and (unofficial Emperor of mixed Slovenian-Croat origin) Josip Broz Tito (1892\u22121980) tried to forge a new \u201cYugoslav nation\u201d.[9]<\/a> The former (ruler of royal Yugoslavia) coined the notion of \u201ctriple-one nation\u201d (composed of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs), whereas J. B. Tito (dictator of socialist Yugoslavia) pressed for the \u201dbrotherhood and unity\u201d of all Yugoslav nations (six of them were recognized as such).<\/p>\n The first approach was defective in the sense that the ethnical approach was obsolete and illegitimate (considering the presence of non-Slavic populations), whereas Tito\u2019s brotherhood was equally out of context, considering the ethnical mixture of the Yugoslavs. With nationalism, one encounters the same problem as with religions. They help the same nationalities or confessions become more compact, but on the other hand, they create the feeling of alienation between different entities and ultimately bring about animosities and even conflicts. As in the rest of East-Central Europe, socialism (communism) was finally replaced with nationalism, but only in Yugoslavia with the civil war (1991\u20121995).[10]<\/a><\/p>\n It is necessary to mention that one of the crucial features of the royalist Yugoslavia, a country officially proclaimed on December 1st<\/sup>, 1918, under the official title, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes<\/em>, was the fact that the three recognized ethnonational groups (\u201ctribes\u201d) expressed diametrically different political projects concerning the political system of the new country. In other words, the Serbs favored centralism for the sake of avoiding a civil war with Croats concerning the division of the country according to ethnic background\/lines. On the other side, Slovenes and Croats favored federalism, with clear ethnonational administrative borders. In practice, however, no one side was satisfied as a new state was divided administratively into 33 artificial territorial units. However, since 1929, according to the new territorial-administrative division of the state, only Slovenia and Montenegro received their own territorial satisfaction within a single administrative unit (banovina\/banat)-Slovenia as Dravska banovina and (Greater) Montenegro as Zetska banovina (do not forget that the King of Yugoslavia at that time, Alexander Kara\u0111or\u0111evi\u0107, was born in Montenegro in 1888, having a royal Montenegrin blood!).<\/p>\n The Second Yugoslavia (1945\u20121991)<\/strong><\/p>\n Socialist (second) Yugoslavia (Titoslavia) was born in 1945 after WWII, which started in Yugoslavia in April 1941 and finished in May 1945. In other words, royalist Yugoslavia was just about to disintegrate when WWII started (by German heavy bombing of Belgrade on April 6th<\/sup>, 1941), and the division of the occupied territory of Yugoslavia made the heterogeneous structure more than conspicuous.<\/p>\n As a historical fact, J. B. Tito succeeded in re-establishing Yugoslavia in 1945 after the bloody civil war, followed by ethnic cleansing and genocide primarily against the Serbs, but at the cost of a communist dictatorship.[11]<\/a> Moreover, he was able to keep his position thanks to his Croat-Slovenian nationality (and his Serb wife, to some extent), thus balancing the numerical predominance of the Serb population under the unofficial slogan: \u201cWeaker Serbia \u2013 Stronger Yugoslavia!\u201d A new ideological conception of socialist Yugoslavia offered a new dimension of the Yugoslav unification. The new socialist\/communist state was, after 1944, under firm Slovenian-Croatian ideological and political rule by J. B. Tito (Croat\/Slovenian) and Edvard Kardelj (Slovenian). However, up to 1971 (when the Croatian Spring started), a common Yugoslav identity and solidarity, but within the socialist system of the Titoist Yugoslavia, was developed.<\/p>\n Another important balancing factor was the economic strength of the leading republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, which appeared evenly distributed, owing to the different levels of civilization in these parts of the common state. Namely, the gross national product per capita was inversely proportional to the number of the respective republic. The Republic of Serbia was an average of the whole state, and its contribution to the federal fund for the underdeveloped republics and Kosovo matched the donation from the federal fund to Kosovo. That means the other underdeveloped republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, were supported by Slovenia and Croatia. Here, it has to be noticed that the Yugoslav federal fund for the underdeveloped regions (republics and Kosovo, coming from the former Ottoman-occupied and ruled provinces) functioned like to similar fund by the European Union (EU) devoted to the underdeveloped EU member states (coming from the ex-socialist systems).<\/p>\n A serious threat to the so-called centrifugal Yugoslav forces appeared in the late 1980s, in the form of the Croat Ante Markovi\u0107, elected (within the communist political system) as the Prime Minister (PM) of the federal state structure. This capable executive, a manager of a successful Croatian enterprise, managed to give a considerable impulse to the declining Yugoslav economy. He introduced the convertible Yugoslav dinar, the first in socialist Yugoslavia, and the people managed to save a great deal of money in the local banks.\u00a0 He became ever more popular, to the consternation of the nationalists from the Yugoslav republics. Ante Markovi\u0107 founded a new party, the so-called Reform Party, which threatened to marginalize all local republican political organizations, including communist and pro-communist parties, followed by all republican national-patriotic newly established political organizations.<\/p>\n However, his economic policy was framed within the framework of transferring federal money to Croatia and Slovenia at the expense of the \u201csoutherners\u201d. The response of those against him was quick. The campaign against Ante Markovi\u0107 was open from all public means, in particular from Croatia and especially from Serbia. Serbia did not even hesitate to raid the federal fund and take money for its own use. Various republics turned against Ante Markovi\u0107 for different reasons. Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107 saw in him his rival, somebody who would take the leading role on the federal scene. Croatia and Slovenia were afraid of his eventual successful preservation of the federal state and thus prolongation of their efforts to secede from Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n The practical dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia was initiated by Slovenia. The dissolution started with a seemingly innocent incident. A Slovenian journalist wrote an article sympathetic to the Kosovo Albanian cause.[12]<\/a> The next day, when he was entering his office, he was intercepted by an Albanian, who presented him with a bottle of Skenderbeg<\/em>brandy (the famous spirit drink from Albania), thanking him for the support (of Kosovo\u2019s separation from Serbia and Yugoslavia). After that, new articles on the subject were issued, and the Slovenian public was \u201cprepared\u201d for the pro-Kosovo Albanian cause. Soon, a meeting was arranged in the largest hall in Ljubljana (and Slovenia), \u201cCankarjev dom\u201d, when Slovenian and Kosovo Albanian speakers accused Serbia of suppression of the Albanians in Kosovo. This absolutely provocative and Serbophobic meeting was organized under the official slogan: \u201cKosovo\u2012My Motherland\u201d. Nevertheless, the response from Serbia was as furious as superfluous, with the rhetoric of \u201cwounded national feelings\u201d, \u201cbetrayal\u201d, etc. But the ghost was released from the bottle. Slovenia showed that it was opting for secession from Yugoslavia. The politics of secession was immediately followed by Croat nationalists, and the process of the Yugoslav dissolution was soon gaining impetus.<\/p>\n Division Lines Within Post-Titoist Yugoslavia (1980\u20121991)<\/strong><\/p>\n From the more \u201cideological side\u201d, the division of the Yugoslav political scene at the end of the 1980s was outlined by the speed of democratization of the society. In this respect, Slovenia took the lead, with Croatia following. However, the democratization process in Croatia took the pure form of banal nationalism and even neo-Nazism. In Serbia, it was Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107, and more importantly, his wife, Mirjana Markovi\u0107, who obstinately tried to slow down the inevitable development of the Yugoslav society, from an autocratic to (quasi)democratic (and nationalistic) one. They remained chained in their communist mentality,\u00a0 incapable of adopting a more flexible attitude. Slovenes and Croats accused them that they dreamed of restoring Tito\u2019s Yugoslavia, with S. Milo\u0161evi\u0107 taking over the role of Josip Broz Tito.<\/p>\n However, at the same time, the Serbs accused Croatian \u201cdemocrats\u201d (the HDZ led by Dr. Franjo Tu\u0111man) of restoring a Nazi-fascist Greater Croatia from WWII. When the Milo\u0161evi\u0107 couple realized the illusory character of their political intentions, the time was lost, and Serbia came to crtan extend behind Slovenia and Croatia in the process of political \u201cdemocratization\u201d.<\/p>\n As for other republics, their roles appeared marginal, as expected, since they were even less advanced in that matter than Serbia. In Slovenia and Croatia, oppositional political parties, different from the existing communist party, won the first \u201cfree elections\u201d,[13]<\/a> whereas in Serbia, newly founded non-Communist parties attracted much fewer voters and remained marginal on the political scene. Thus, a serious division in Yugoslavia appeared \u2013 (quasi)democratic west and modified communist Serbia. When the practical disintegration moves started, it was obvious who was going to gain sympathy from the West.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n Another important division between the eastern and western parts of Yugoslavia was a confessional one. Slovenia and Croatia are predominantly Roman-Catholic, whereas Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia belong to the Christian-Orthodox realm. As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, their partition was the following: Muslims 43,7%, Serb-Orthodox 31,3% and Croat Roman-Catholic 17,3%.[15]<\/a> However, such an ethno-confessional composition will turn out fatal for this republic in the first half of the 1990s (during the civil war).<\/p>\n We turn now to two important aspects of the Yugoslav disintegration: 1) ethno-sociological diversity and 2) a formal frame for the dismantling of a state which was existed for almost a century.<\/p>\n The focal ethnic groups in the first (royalist) Yugoslavia were (according to post-1945 ethnonational identification):[16]<\/a><\/p>\n Serbs (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia)<\/p>\n Croats (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia)<\/p>\n Slovenians (Slovenia)<\/p>\n Muslims\/Bo\u0161njaks (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro)<\/p>\n Macedonians (Macedonia)<\/p>\n Albanians (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro)<\/p>\n Hungarians (Serbia)<\/p>\n Germans (Serbia, Slovenia)<\/p>\n Roma\/Gypsis (Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia)<\/p>\n Principal languages: Serbo-Croat (Serbs, Croats, Muslims)<\/p>\n Slovenian (Slovenians)<\/p>\n Macedonian (Macedonians)<\/p>\n Albanian (Shqiptars).<\/p>\n The Serbo-Croat linguistic region was the most important and central, covering Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. We have to keep in mind that around 75% of the Yugoslavs spoke the official Serbo-Croat language (in essence, this language was Serbian).[17]<\/a><\/p>\n One has to designate that the biggest part of Yugoslavs (75%) spoke the official Serbo-Croat (or Croato-Serb) language as a mother tongue\/native (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro) with some understandable regional lexical differences, although the grammar and orthography were the same (with two alphabets \u2013 Latin and Cyrillic). Nevertheless, it was there that the most violent and bloody events occurred during the destruction of Titoist Yugoslavia, followed by the civil war in the first half of the 1990s. However, the above division along the formal ethnic and confessional (Roman Catholic, Christian Orthodox, and Muslim) lines turned out for many experts to be probably of lesser importance in the issuing conflicts and massacres in the period (1991\u22121995). In fact, therefore, it is needed to reformulate the partition of the territory of the ex-Serbo-Croat language (Shtokavian dialect), to understand properly the way the whole state disintegrated.<\/p>\n The Regional Mentalities and Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n There are three crucial regions of ex-Yugoslavia playing the fatal role in the formation of the mentality and behaviour of their inhabitants \u2013 Dinaric, Pannonian, and Intermediate:<\/p>\n This simplified picture, however, may be misleading. Due to permanent migration from the highlands towards the lowlands, mountainous people have been present all over the Serbo-Croatian linguistic area, in particular in the towns. Apart from the steady individual\/familial influx from the Dinaric region, plain people have been experiencing waves of migrations after some violent events, like wars or uprisings (the so-called metanastatic migrations).<\/p>\n One of these migration waves took place in 1944\u20121945, after WWII, when a considerable number of Dinaroids moved to the Pannonian plain and capital towns, like Belgrade and Zagreb. Since it was they who took the principal part in the vining Titoist partisan guerrilla during the war, these intruders occupied high state positions after the war, both military and civic. With their pronounced tribal mentality, they took control over the surrounding population, mainly via communist party membership, since they constituted the bulk of the membership of the Yugoslav communist party. Actually, this situation will prove to be focal in the events that ensued in the disintegration and destruction of the second Yugoslavia.[19]<\/a><\/p>\n Nevertheless, a few words on the organization of power in the state are necessary. Two principal common sectors in the second Yugoslavia were the tools that J. B. Tito used for controlling the state (and society in general) and keeping all republics together. One was the Yugoslav communist party (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, later the Union of Yugoslav Communists), the other the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army (YPA). The first sector was partitioned, however, into republican parties and was liable for mutual tensions and disputes, as it happened several times after WWII. The YPA, on the contrary, was unique and compact, fully devoted to \u201cMarshal\u201d Tito (in fact, he was only an Austro-Hungarian corporal from WWI), who was considered a semi god by the army officers, from corporals to generals. And whenever the state was in danger of disintegrating and the party failed to ensure absolute unity, J. B. Tito (life-long President of Yugoslavia) resorted to his YPA, which was always ready to fulfil his orders.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n When the multiparty system was introduced in 1990, first in Slovenia and Croatia, and then in the rest of Yugoslavia, communist parties became transformed across the country, at least formally, into other entities, suitably renamed (either according to republican or ethnic names). New parties were formed, led as a rule by the former members of the communist parties.[21]<\/a> This turn was to be expected.<\/p>\n First, anybody with political affinities had to choose during Tito\u2019s rule: either to suppress his ambitions or to join the party. The former became apolitical, the latter (in)sincere party members. Some of the latter, unsatisfied with their position within the party hierarchy, founded their own parties to satisfy their craving for power. And in the latter respect, Dinaroids had no match on the Yugoslav political scene. Except for Slovenia and Macedonia (which did not belong to the Serbo-Croat region, anyway), almost all \u201coppositional parties\u201d followed their Dinaroid leaders. In Croatia, these were Franjo Tu\u0111man and Stipe Mesi\u0107, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovi\u0107 and Radovan Karad\u017ei\u0107, in Montenegro, Momir Bulatovi\u0107 and Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107, and finally in Serbia, Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107, as head of his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Vuk Dra\u0161kovi\u0107, leader of the Serb Movement for Renaissance (SPO), and Vojislav \u0160e\u0161elj (got his Ph.D. in Sarajevo), leading the Serb Radical Party (SRS).<\/p>\n The only true Western-type oppositional party in Serbia was the Democratic Party (DS), led by Dragoljub Mi\u0107unovi\u0107 (who himself was in his youth a communist party member) and Zoran \u0110in\u0111i\u0107, a young, represented as liberal philosopher, who got his PhD in West Germany, born in Bosanski \u0160amac in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the same town where the Muslim fundamentalist Alija Izetbegovi\u0107 was born as well (his father was a Yugoslav officer and a member of the communist party). However, later, it turned out that the Democratic Party was pro-NATO and pro-EU. During the NATO aggression on Serbia and Montenegro in 1999, Zoran \u0110in\u0111i\u0107, at that time the leader of the Democratic Party and pro-Western opposition in Serbia, openly supported the heavy bombing by NATO. His personal friend from his studying years in West Germany was Joshika Fisher, the German minister in 1999 who directly participated in the politics of NATO aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the third Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro).<\/p>\n The Beginning of the Destruction of the Second Yugoslavia<\/strong><\/p>\n After the officially announced death of J. B. Tito on May 4th<\/sup>, 1980, Yugoslavia started to experience a new life within the framework of a cross-national coalition of the Yugoslav market reformist communists. In the 1970s, the same concept of a liberal market economy was not successful. However, after 1980, once again, the concept was put on the agenda under pressure from the West, and as a result, a liberal market-oriented reform of the Yugoslav economy became supported by the central Government of the SFRY (second Yugoslavia).<\/p>\n Nevertheless, the reform pro-Western politicians were faced with a very strong socialist-conservative policy coming from the republican management structures. The Yugoslavs experienced in the 1980s the influx of uncontrolled inflation mainly due to the three factors: 1) The national debt (credits) made during the Titoist era had to be paid back; 2) The petrodollar boom became replaced by the extreme cutbacks; 3) The temporal recipe to keep social peace and compensate for a speedy falling standard of living was found in the printing money. The final result was a spiral of rising prices followed by rising salaries, but the living standard of the people was not improved compared with the \u201cgolden age of J. B. Tito\u201d (in fact, with the 1970s). In addition, the social crisis in the 1980s was also kept under certain control by the huge influx of hard currencies from the Yugoslav foreign workers, usually in Western Europe (Germany and Switzerland primarily).[22]<\/a><\/p>\n The Last Attempt to Save Yugoslavia<\/strong><\/p>\n The last PM of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a Croat Ante Markovi\u0107 (1989\u20121991), the professional economist-manager, succeeded in sharply stopping the inflation and, therefore, stopped the economic safety of the people, but laid the healthy basis for the future normal economic life of the country. He promised a quick and radical turn to a liberal market economy, followed by the (problematic and corrupted) wave of the privatization of the state (in the Yugoslav case, formally of people\u2019s) economic property. However, the local republican media, controlled by the republican political establishment, especially in Croatia and Serbia, created the picture of him as an imposter working against the benefits of their own republics. Consequently, his official policy of economic salvation of Yugoslavia did not receive the crucial popular support across the country. Especially his promise of a new kind of Titoist policy of \u201cbrotherhood and unity\u201d within the new framework of a common, free liberal Yugoslav market, failed to be accepted essentially more for political reasons than economic ones.<\/p>\n Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, saw A. Markovi\u0107\u2019s economic reforms as an attempt to integrate Yugoslavia, but as the political expression of a new unitarian conspiracy from Serbia. On the other hand, in Serbia, he was represented as a Croatian Trojan horse of the former Croat Titoist policy of the division of the Serbian nation into several republican boundaries and exploiting Serbia financially at the benefit of Croatia and Slovenia. As the last attempt to economically save Yugoslavia (and therefore politically as well), A. Markovi\u0107 created the coalition of economic leaders coming from all six Yugoslav republics in 1990, but this attempt became immediately undermined by Zagreb and Belgrade (Franjo Tu\u0111man and Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107) as in both republics the so-called \u201cintegrationalist\u201d economic experts (in fact, industrialists, as A. Markovi\u0107 himself was) became quickly replaced by politically loyal local party members.<\/p>\n Alongside the economic reforms, A. Markovi\u0107, as the PM, tried to strengthen the political power of the central Yugoslav Government at the expense of the republican ones, by running the policy of free, federal multi-party democratic elections across the country, but this policy, like his economic reforms, was rejected by the republican leaderships for two reasons: 1) Prepared path to separatism and political independence of the republics; and 2) To defend their own legitimacy, political position, and independent power in their own republics.<\/p>\n The final results of A. Markovi\u0107\u2019s economic reforms were of a political feature as they provoked a dangerous political crisis of legitimacy, which finally destroyed the whole country into republican pieces. In other words, the political interregnum <\/em>that was formed immediately after the collapse of the pro-Yugoslav reforms by A. Markovi\u0107 became totally fulfilled by the populist nationalistic ruling structures from Slovenia to Macedonia. Instead of the reformed economic policy by A. Markovi\u0107, the nationalistic republican leaderships promised to their ethno-nations welfare but mainly at the expense of other ethnic groups (ethnic minorities). The most drastic, and even Nazifascist, case was implemented in Croatia by Dr. Franjo Tu\u0111man and his neo-fascist HDZ (Croatian Democratic Unity), which was doing everything to provoke the open military conflict with the local ethnic Serbs in Croatia. As a result, the real civil war in Yugoslavia started in several locations in Croatia in 1990 between the Croatian armed forces and local Serbian militia.<\/p>\n Personal disclaimer<\/strong>:<\/strong>\u00a0The author\u00a0writes for this publication in a private capacity, which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his\u00a0own personal views. Nothing written by the author\u00a0should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official\u00a0positions of any other media outlet or institution.<\/p>\n \u00a9 Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2025<\/p>\n _______<\/p>\n [1] He was a citizen of Austria-Hungary from the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina. His surname was not at all Serbian Christian Orthodox but rather of Latin Roman Catholic feature while the real personal name probably was Gabriel also of Latin Roman Catholic characteristic. Nevertheless, he had nothing common with Serbia, being born in Bosansko Grahovo in Western Bosnia so far from Serbia, in the town claimed by the Croats to be Croat populated settlement.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Probably the crucial point of the Sarajevo assassination was that first, Serbia did not want the war against Austria-Hunary and, therefore, second, Serbian ambassador in Vienna, Jovan Jovanovi\u0107 Pi\u017eon, informed the authorities of Austria-Hungary several days before the event about the possibility of assassination but Austro-Hungarian intelligent service did nothing to prevent it [\u0434\u0440 \u0427\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0440 \u0410\u043d\u0442\u0438\u045b, \u0421\u0440\u043f\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: Vukoti\u0107 Media, 2019, 245].<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> D. D. Apis (who incidentally was a Vlach from East Serbia) will be accused of a plot against Serbian Prince-Regent Alexander Kara\u0111or\u0111evic in 1917 at the Thessalonica (Macedonian) Front and executed. In sum, he executed one King, one Queen, one Archduke, and tried to kill one Prince-Regent.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> See more in: \u041c\u0438\u0440\u0430 \u0420\u0430\u0434\u043e\u0458\u0435\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u0409\u0443\u0431\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0433 \u0414\u0438\u043c\u0438\u045b, \u0421\u0440\u0431\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0443 \u0412\u0435\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443 1914\u20121918. \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0421\u041a\u0417\u2012\u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u0443\u043c \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0442 \u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0445, 2014.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> His the most prominent academic publication was: \u0412\u0430\u0441\u0430 \u0427\u0443\u0431\u0440\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u0418\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0435 \u043c\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0443 \u0421\u0440\u0431\u0438\u0458\u0438 <\/em>XIX <\/em>\u0432\u0435\u043a\u0430<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434, 1982. On relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in the 20th<\/sup> century with the focal issue of\u201cSarajevo Assassination\u201d and Austro-Hungarian war proclamation to Serbia in summer 1914 see: \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0440 \u040b\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u041e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438 \u0438\u0437\u043c\u0435\u0452\u0443 \u0421\u0440\u0431\u0438\u0458\u0435 \u0438 \u0410\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e-\u0423\u0433\u0430\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0435 \u0443 <\/em>XX<\/em> \u0432\u0435\u043a\u0443<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0411\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0430 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430, 1992. The author of the book, a Bosnian Serb and Belgrade University professor and rector after 1918, claims that according to all relevant historical sources, especially those from the Austro-Hungarian archives, official Serbian Government and state institutions are not guilty for the \u201cSarajevo Assassination\u201d \u2013 an event that became used as a pretext to launch the war against Serbia by Austria-Hungary (in fact Germany).<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Ivan Bo\u017ei\u0107, at al., Istorija Jugoslavije<\/em>, drugo izdanje (second edition), Beograd: Prosveta, 403.<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Dragutin Pavli\u010devi\u0107, Povijest Hrvatske<\/em>, Drugo, izmijenjeno i pro\u0161ireno izdanje, Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavi\u010di\u0107, 2000, 75\u201277.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> See more in: \u0409\u0443\u0431\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0433 \u0414\u0438\u043c\u0438\u045b, \u041a\u0443\u043b\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0459\u0435\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0435 \u0408\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0458\u0435 1918\u20121941<\/em>, I\u2012III, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0421\u0442\u0443\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0438 \u043a\u0443\u043b\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435, 1997.<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> On the life of the King Alexander Kara\u0111or\u0111evi\u0107 see: \u0411\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432 \u0413\u043b\u0438\u0433\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0435\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0459 \u0410\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0440 \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0452\u043e\u0440\u0452\u0435\u0432\u0438\u045b<\/em>, I\u2012III, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0417\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0434 \u0437\u0430 \u0443\u045f\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0435 \u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430. On the life of Josip Broz Tito see: \u041f\u0435\u0440\u043e \u0421\u0438\u043c\u0438\u045b, \u0422\u0438\u0442\u043e: \u0424\u0435\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d 20. \u0432\u0435\u043a\u0430<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a\u2212\u0421\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0446\u0438 \u0435\u043f\u043e\u0445\u0435, 2011.<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> See more in: Ruth Petrie (ed.), The Fall of Communism and the Rise of Nationalism<\/em>, The Index Reader, London\u2012Washington: Cassell, 1997.<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> On the Balkan dictators see in: Bernd J. Fischer, Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritatian Rulers of Southeast Europe<\/em>, 2007.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Whether it was motivated by the fear from Kosovo Albanian violent political demands, in view of the Para\u0107in massacre<\/em>, or was a genuine sympathy of the by far most advanced republic of Yugoslavia with by far the most retarded region in the same state, is a question, though interesting in itself, but outside the scope of our topic here.<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> In Croatia both parliamentary and presidential elections won ultranationalistic and even Nazi party of HDZ \u2013 Croatian Democratic Union and its party leader, Dr. Franjo Tu\u0111man.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> However, those sympathies, especially by Vatican and Germany, have been gained even before the elections in 1990.<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia<\/em>, New Haven\u2212London: Yale University Press, 1997, 317.<\/p>\n [16]<\/a> In the second (socialist) Yugoslavia,\u00a0 the same ethnic content\u00a0 was retained, with the difference that\u00a0 Germans in Serbia (so-called Volksdeutschers<\/em>, Vojvodina) have migrated to Germany, or have been banished there by the new communist regime. Also, a small Italian minority in Slovenia and Croatia (Istria\u00a0 and Dalmatia) has been banished to Italy in 1945.<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> See more in: \u041c\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0448 \u041a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0447\u0435\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u0423 \u043e\u0434\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0443 \u0458\u0435\u0437\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u0440\u043f\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u0430\u2012\u0438 \u0434\u0430\u0459\u0435. \u0421\u0430 \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043e \u0441\u0440\u043f\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0458\u0435\u0437\u0438\u043a\u0443<\/em>, \u0414\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e, \u0434\u043e\u043f\u0443\u045a\u0435\u043d\u043e \u0438\u0437\u0434\u0430\u045a\u0435, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0422\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043d\u0438\u043a, 1999; \u041f\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0440 \u041c\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0441\u0430\u0432\u0459\u0435\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u0421\u0440\u043f\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0444\u0438\u043b\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0448\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u0422\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043d\u0438\u043a, 2000.<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> On the mental and ethnocultural characters of the Yugoslavs, see in: \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0440 \u0414\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0438\u045b, \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0408\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0430<\/em>, \u0411\u0435\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434: \u041f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0430, 2000 (1939).<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> On the fall of second Yuoslavia from the Wstern perspective, see in: Carl-Ulrik Schierup, \u201eFrom Fraternity to Fratricide. Nationalism, Globalism and the Fall of Yugoslavia\u201c, in Stefano Banchini, George Sch\u00f6pflin (eds.), State Building in the Balkans: Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21st Century<\/em>, Ravena: Longo Editore, 1998.<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> This was the case in 1971\/1972 (\u201cCroatian Spring\u201d), when first Croatian, and then Serbian parties exhibited some rebellious mood and J. B. Tito threatened them by the YPA intervention.<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> The only notable exception was the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovi\u0107, who started (end ended) his political career as Muslim fundamentalist, and spent many years in prison but never was a membr of communist party.<\/p>\n\n
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