Yves here. This post makes an extremely useful observation, even though it is a bit more in economese than is ideal, despite it being aimed at generalist readers. It effectively makes the point that class warfare is a significant factor in why inflation persists. But oddly the author is loath to use the phrase \u201cclass warfare\u201d even though he describes a struggle between labor and business owners\/operators. <\/p>\n
There is ample historical and recent proof of his view. In the 1970s stagflation, cost of living adjustments to worker pay, which for most enterprises is their biggest single expense, kept those costs increasing at the same clip as inflation, which meant they would typically seek to preserve margins by then increasing prices to a similar degree. Even though white collar workers generally did not have formal COLA, it had become a widespread practice to also increase their compensation in line with inflation so as to preserve their status relative to union\/factory personnel. This is one reason that economists who have done granular analysis of the much-derided Nixon wage\/price freeze says the Administration threw in the towel just as it was beginning to work\u2026if nothing else, by resetting the inflation level used in the COLAs. <\/p>\n
In the current iteration of how class warfare works at a time when corporations have greatly reduced labor bargaining power, we have repeatedly pointed out that in the US, corporate profits are nearly twice the level they were at as a percent of GDP in the early 2000s\u2026.a level Warren Buffett had deemed at the time to be unsustainably high. In the sticky Covid-induced inflation, many commentators have accused companies of engaging in \u201cgreedflation,\u201d as in putting through price increases that were not necessary to cover cost rises, under the cover of general inflation. We\u2019ve confirmed that behavior recently in the case of Kraft Heinz, where their price gouging accelerated the inroads made by more modestly priced store brands<\/a>. <\/p>\n By Nicholas M. Burotto, Lecturer in Economics, School of Economics and Business, Universidad Andr\u00e9s Bello. Originally published at the Institute for New Economic Thinking website<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n The inflation surge that followed the COVID-19 pandemic took policymakers by surprise. Central banks across advanced and emerging economies initially described the price rise as temporary, attributing it to supply chain disruptions, energy shocks, and post-lockdown demand surges. However, as inflation proved persistent, monetary authorities responded with sharp interest rate hikes to restore price stability and credibility. In theory, tighter monetary policy and the normalization of labor markets should have stabilized inflation.<\/p>\n Yet inflation has proven far more stubborn than anticipated.<\/p>\n Although macroeconomic \u201cgaps\u201d are closing\u2014unemployment is falling, production is recovering, demand is flattening\u2014inflation has often refused to retreat. Something else is at play. A closer look suggests that the forces driving inflation are not just technical or monetary. They are social. They are political. And, most importantly, they are conflictual<\/em>.<\/p>\n In my new INET Working Paper<\/a>, I explore a structural explanation for inflation persistence that is not rooted in expectations or contracts, but in the conflicting income perceptions of firms and workers. Inflation inertia is reinterpreted as the result of a dynamic, antagonistic struggle for income shares, where even a market in equilibrium can fail to restore stability.<\/p>\n The core idea is simple: both employees and companies strive for a certain real wage level. Employees want rising wages that reflect their growing material expectations\u2014better consumption, more security, and a higher standard of living. Firms, for their part, strive for real profits or, to put it another way, for a cost structure that maintains their return on capital.<\/p>\n When these aspirations clash and when one of the two sides has enough bargaining power, price and wage adjustments become weapons in an ongoing conflict. Inflation in this sense is not caused by \u201coverheating\u201d or fiscal largesse, but by the inability of market forces to reconcile these incompatible goals.<\/p>\n This view differs markedly from standard inflation models that emphasize nominal rigidities, expectations, or monetary aggregates. Instead, inflation is seen as a social process: one that reflects the unresolved struggle over who gets what in the economy.<\/p>\n A central concept in the paper is the aspiration gap: the difference between the income that both groups currently receive and what they think they should<\/em> receive. This concept has its roots in the work of Rowthorn (1977) and Dutt (1987) and was later developed further by other theorists who emphasized how desired wage and profit shares influence price behavior.<\/p>\n Firms and workers not only react to the demands of others but also pursue their own targets (or aspirations). These targets can be influenced by past income, historical contexts, cultural norms, expectations of future consumption, or simply by observing what others are getting. And crucially, they\u2019re sticky. They won\u2019t disappear overnight, even if economic fundamentals do.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n If one of the two groups has enough bargaining power, these aspirations don\u2019t just shape expectations\u2014they shape actual outcomes. Workers raise their wage demands to close the gap. Firms respond with higher prices to defend their profit margins. This dynamic leads to a self-reinforcing process in which both sides\u2019 attempts to fulfill their aspirations feed into ongoing inflation.<\/p>\n This is the essence of inertia: inflation continues not because<\/em> of new shocks, but because the imbalances of the past have created a momentum of their own that institutions and markets alone have difficulty counteracting.<\/p>\n Conventional economic models tend to assume that inflation can be contained as soon as markets return to equilibrium\u2014that is when supply meets demand and expectations are anchored. Following Olivera (1991), in my research<\/a> I emphasize an important distinction: the difference between market equilibrium<\/em> and social equilibrium<\/em>:<\/p>\n The problem is that these two forms of equilibrium do not necessarily overlap<\/strong>.<\/p>\n You can have a stable labor market, yet workers may feel underpaid. You can have stable profits and yet firms strive for higher margins. If market equilibrium does not eliminate social dissatisfaction, inflationary pressures will persist.<\/p>\n In fact, one of the more surprising results of the model is that even when both gaps\u2014market and social\u2014are temporarily closed, inflation can persist. This is because aspirations are not passive: they adapt, evolve, and sometimes escalate. They are social constructs shaped by many components. In this way, inertia survives equilibrium. It becomes a kind of slow-burning fuse that reignites inflation even after the initial fire has been extinguished.<\/p>\n Bargaining Power and the Dynamics of Persistence<\/strong><\/p>\n Another important innovation of the paper is the formalization of the interplay between bargaining power and inflation persistence.<\/p>\n When firms and workers have limited power, the system behaves more like a neoclassical adjustment: inflation declines when demand stabilizes. However, if one of the two groups has considerable power\u2014especially asymmetric power\u2014the dynamic changes. If workers have strong bargaining power, wage inflation may continue even after demand shocks subside, as they push to fulfill their aspirational wage gap. When firms are dominant, price inflation persists as they raise prices to defend their ideal profit margins, regardless of cost conditions or real demand.<\/p>\n When both groups exercise power simultaneously\u2014pushing in opposite directions\u2014the system oscillates. Persistent inflation causes real wages to fluctuate, often with increasing volatility. This is reminiscent of the \u201cSimonsen curve\u201d described in Latin American structuralist models, where indexation mechanisms and feedback loops create a sawtooth-like dynamic of real wage adjustment.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n What\u2019s new in this model is that no explicit indexation is required. The same inertial effects can be generated purely through aspiration gaps, bargaining power, and conflict dynamics alone\u2014an insight that engages in both the heterodox and structuralist traditions.<\/p>\n If market mechanisms cannot close aspiration gaps, and if bargaining power fuels inflationary cycles, how can stability be restored?<\/p>\n The answer, I argue, lies not (necessarily) in technocratic tinkering but in social and political consensus. As I show in the paper the only stable and desirable system is one in which both workers and firms have moderate bargaining power and in which aspirations are collectively managed.<\/p>\n This does not mean freezing wages or profits. It means coordination\u2014through institutions, norms, or policies\u2014that reconcile income claims with macroeconomic goals<\/em>. This could take the form of wage pacts, inflation-targeting frameworks with labor participation, or even cultural changes that dampen the escalation of aspirations.<\/p>\n In short, controlling inflation is not just a monetary task, it is a distributive one.<\/p>\n Without mechanisms to mediate conflict, inflation will survive the shocks that triggered it. It will become endemic, not because the economy is overheated, but because society is out of balance.<\/p>\n In today\u2019s world, where inflation has once again become a central economic problem, it is tempting to reach for familiar tools: raise interest rates, cut spending, wait for demand to cool. However, the persistence of inflation in many contexts suggests that deeper forces are at work.<\/p>\n What if inflation is not just a monetary phenomenon, but a reflection of unresolved distributional tensions?<\/p>\n My research proposes that inflation inertia arises not from exogenous shocks or adaptive expectations but from the endogenous dynamics of social conflict. It shows that market equilibrium is not enough and that social dissatisfaction can drive inflation even in a stable economy.<\/p>\n To truly stabilize prices, we may need to stabilize something deeper: the struggle for income shares, aspirations, and power.<\/p>\n Notes <\/strong><\/p>\n [1]<\/a> A different approach is taken by Bernanke and Blanchard (2025), who analyze post-pandemic inflation across eleven economies using a model that focuses on price shocks, a tight labor market, and inflation expectations. Their results emphasize the transitory nature of supply shocks and a limited, albeit increasing, role of wage pressures in tight labor markets. While their framework helps explain short-term inflation dynamics, my model proposes a complementary mechanism: Inflation persistence can also arise from unfulfilled aspiration gaps and distributional conflict, even in the absence of new shocks or unanchored expectations. From this perspective, social and institutional dynamics\u2014and not just macroeconomic slack\u2014are key to understanding why inflation persists.<\/em><\/p>\nThe Missing Link: Distributional Conflict<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Aspiration Gaps and the Roots of Inertia<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Two Equilibria, One Instability<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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The Case for Consensus<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Conclusion: Inflation as a Mirror of Social Tensions<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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