By Lambert Strether of Corrente.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n \u201cThe system\u2019s not broken. It\u2019s fixed.\u201d<\/em> \u2013Apocryphal<\/p>\n I apologize to readers for the lateness of the hour. Normally, I\u2019d sacrifice a Water Cooler, but I feel that with less than two weeks to go in the election, that would not be A Good Thing. \u2013lambert<\/p>\n An important article in Vanity Fair, \u201cInside the Bungled Bird Flu Response, Where Profits Collide With Public Health<\/a>\u201d (archive<\/a>), has broken the mainstream silence on the ill-controlled spread of \u201cbird flu\u201d (H5N1\/HPAI HN51), so reminiscent of Covid in 2020, although proceeding at a slower pace (and yet with greater potential risk). In this post, I\u2019ll first give a quick summary of the current state of play, where bird flu, from its start in Texas, and spread in the Midwest, has now leaped the Rockies, and is infecting both cattle and chickens in California (though the main focus of this post will be cattle). After briefly straightening out terminology and discussing risk, I will go through the Vanity Fair Article, quoting and contextualizing great slabs of it. I\u2019ll conclude by comparing our response to \u201cbird flu\u201d with our responses to pandemics past. Caveat that this is really yellow wader material, but I am not yet familiar enough with the (several) institutions involved to do this. <\/p>\n Let\u2019s begin with this optimistic statement from Ag Insider\u2019s Food & Environment Reporting Network<\/a> on October 6, 2024. The lead:<\/p>\n Although California reported outbreaks of bird flu in 12 dairy herds last week, most states have gone weeks without new cases being discovered, including those with high levels of scrutiny, according to USDA data. Agriculture deputy undersecretary Eric Deeble cited Colorado and Michigan as examples of the tailing off of infections and said during a multi-agency teleconference that \u201cthis decrease gives us confidence\u201d of eliminating the virus in dairy cattle by isolating herds.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Sadly, by October 20 we saw this headline in the Los Angeles Times: \u201cAs bird flu outbreaks rise, piles of dead cattle become shocking Central Valley tableau<\/a>.\u201d Again the lead:<\/p>\n There\u2019s a sickness hovering over Tulare County\u2018s dairy industry. On a recent 98-degree afternoon, dead cows and calves were piled up along the roadside. Thick swarms of black flies hummed and knocked against the windows of an idling car, while crows and vultures waited nearby \u2014 eyeballing the taut and bloated carcasses roasting in the October heat. Since the H5N1 bird flu virus was first reported in California in early August, 124 dairy herds and 13 people \u2014 all dairy workers \u2014 had been infected as of Friday. And according to dairy experts, the spread of the virus has yet to abate.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Clearly, the USDA\u2019s \u201cconfidence\u201d was misplaced. Before getting into gist of the article, let\u2019s clear up the terminology issues.<\/p>\n Terminology: \u201cBird Flu\u201d or \u201cH5N1\u201d?<\/strong><\/p>\n Wikipedia (sorry) redirects \u201cBird Flu\u201d to the fancier \u201cAvian Influenza<\/a>,\u201d where we find that bird flu is caused by the Influenza A virus, of which there are two types: low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) and high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), \u201clow\u201d and \u201chigh\u201d depending on the symptoms in bird<\/em>, not mammals, cows being mammals (as are humans). H5N1 is a particularly virulent subtype of HPAI, although there are others, like H7N3 or H7N9<\/a>. (The entry also includes a guide to the nomenclature<\/a>).<\/p>\n In this post, I will write \u201cH5N1\u201d and not \u201cbird flu\u201d, partly because that is, after all, the correct nomenclature for the virus that is actually circulating, but also to make the question \u201cWhy do cattle get diseases for birds?\u201d) go away. Note, however, that some epidemiologists will say HPAI, because (presumably) the same measures can be used to control all subtypes of such viruses, and others will say \u201cHPAI\/H5N1\u201d. I think this proliferation of names is in good faith (unlike the decision making at WHO<\/a> when choosing the name \u201cCovid-19<\/a>). CDC writes \u201cHPAI A(H5N1).\u201d<\/p>\n H5N1 Risks<\/strong><\/p>\n H5N1 is dangerous stuff. Worse, we\u2019ve known that for a long time; dead cattle by the road should come as no surprise. From Nature, \u201cThe global H5N1 influenza panzootic in mammals<\/a>\u201c:<\/p>\n Influenza A viruses (IAV) have caused more documented global pandemics in human history than any other pathogen1,2. High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses belonging to the H5N1 subtype are a leading pandemic risk. Two decades after H5N1 \u201cbird flu\u201d became established in poultry in Southeast Asia, its descendants have resurged, setting off an H5N1 panzootic in wild birds that is fueled by (a) rapid intercontinental spread, reaching South America and Antarctica for the first time; (b) fast evolution via genomic reassortment; and (c) frequent spillover into terrestrial and marine mammals9 , including European fur farms, South American marine mammals, and US dairy cattle, . Historically, swine are considered optimal intermediary hosts that help avian influenza viruses (AIV) adapt to mammals before jumping to humans. However, the altered ecology of H5N1 has opened the door to new evolutionary pathways. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Contrast CDC\u2019s statement on \u201crisk to humans<\/a>\u201d (I\u2019ve helpfully underlined the minimizations):<\/p>\n The wide geographic spread of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds, poultry, and some other mammals, including in cows, create additional opportunities for people to be exposed to these viruses. Therefore, there be an increase in human infections resulting from bird and animal exposures, even if the risk of these viruses spreading from birds to people has not increased. CDC believes the risk from bird flu viruses is . People who have job-related or recreational exposure to infected birds or animals, including cows, are at greater risk of contracting HPAI A(H5N1) virus.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n At least they\u2019re not telling us it\u2019s \u201cmild.\u201d This is cheerfully naive tosh at best, eugenicist framing at worst. Have these people never heard of Taleb\u2019s \u201crisk of ruin<\/a>\u201c? Of the precautionary principle<\/a>? Apparently not, as we shall see now that we turn to Vanity Fair.<\/p>\n How Our H5N1 Response Went Wrong<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cInside the Bungled Bird Flu Response, Where Profits Collide With Public Health<\/a>\u201d (\u201cBungled\u201d) starts with the relationship between veterinarians and the USDA:<\/p>\n [W]hen something goes seriously wrong on America\u2019s plains and pastures, something that could threaten animal safety or food production, USDA officials rely on rural veterinarians to sound the alarm.<\/p>\n Those vets report findings to state veterinarians, whose doors and inboxes are always open. They even post their cell phone numbers online. The state veterinarians, in turn, utilize a network of diagnostic laboratories approved by the USDA, chief among them the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa.<\/p>\n There\u2019s little standing on ceremony, and state veterinarians generally feel free to reach out directly to leading USDA officials\u2026. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Until now:<\/p>\n That, at least, is how it\u2019s supposed to work. It\u2019s how veterinarians responding to dairy farms in the Texas panhandle earlier this year assumed it would work when they stumbled upon hellish scenes out of a horror movie. Feverish cows in respiratory distress producing trickles of milk. Dying cats. Enough dead barn pigeons and blackbirds to suggest a mass poisoning. Living birds with twisted necks, their heads tilted skyward.<\/p>\n Worried vets enlisted help from colleagues in other states. In mid-March, one sent an email to an emergency address at the NVSL, urging the lab to test for something seemingly unthinkable: highly pathogenic avian influenza, which had never before been detected in cows.<\/p>\n Days went by in silence.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The risks (of ruin, as above) are known:<\/p>\n Experts are hesitant to speculate about what could happen if the virus were to begin more widely infecting humans, for fear of spreading panic, but the toll could, in the worst case, dwarf that of COVID-19. If the virus \u2018infects a person infected with a human flu strain, and something comes out that is reassorted and adapted to humans? I don\u2019t even want to imagine,\u2019 [J\u00fcrgen Richt, regents and university distinguished professor at Kansas State University] says. \u2018Not good.\u2019 <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n But USDA failed to act:<\/p>\n At that existential moment back in March, when the virus was first detected in cows, veterinarians involved in the response had every expectation that a well-honed network of experts, led by USDA scientists, would immediately rev to life.<\/p>\n But it didn\u2019t. \u201cNobody came,\u201d says one veterinarian in a Western state. \u201cWhen the diagnosis came in, the government stood still. They didn\u2019t know what to do, so they did nothing.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Not precisely:<\/p>\n The vets who sounded the alarm have been silenced, some even fired, and won\u2019t discuss their experiences on the record for fear of reprisals. And the federal agency that was supposed to help thwart the virus instead has allowed for an unspoken \u201cdon\u2019t test, don\u2019t tell\u201d policy among dairy farmers.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The rot certainly set in faster than with Covid!<\/p>\n Why Our H5N1 Response Went Wrong<\/strong><\/p>\n Continuing with \u201cBungled<\/a>\u201c, the Biden administration at least gestured in the direction of improving the Federal Government\u2019s to pandemics:<\/p>\n In the wake of the badly bungled federal response to COVID-19, the Biden administration took steps to guarantee a swifter and more coordinated response to future outbreaks. In June 2023, it established the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR) and appointed the retired major general Paul Friedrichs, a former military doctor with a decades-long career in biosecurity preparedness, as director.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Then H5N1 struck the dairy industry:<\/p>\n But when a black swan scenario materialized this spring\u2014an unprecedented bird flu outbreak in dairy cows, originating in Texas, during an election year in which absolutely no one wants to talk about scary viruses\u2014Friedrichs faced a jumble of state and federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. The Food and Drug Administration regulates milk, the CDC handles human infections, and the USDA oversees cows and farms, which are often staffed by undocumented immigrants who may be reluctant to interact with government officials.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The key point is the FDA\u2019s dual mandate: The health and safety of the nation\u2019s food animals, and promoting and protecting America\u2019s $174.2 billion agriculture trade:<\/p>\n Looming over the USDA\u2019s reluctance to conduct a more transparent and proactive campaign against H5N1 in dairy cows are export agreements worth more than $24 billion each year, which include 2.6 million tons of milk, cheese, and ice cream, not to mention more than 5 million tons of poultry and beef. For years, poultry trade agreements have stipulated that the birds be free of H5N1. No one ever considered that such a caveat was needed for the dairy and beef agreements.<\/p>\n If those products were to be returned to US markets, it could shrink key agricultural industries and threaten American jobs. \u201cThe fear boils down to: How will this affect us in trade?\u201d says Alan Young, chief technology officer for Medgene, an animal-vaccine company. \u201cNobody knows what the effects are, but .\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n And \u201cbusiness concerns\u201d won out:<\/p>\n Says Rick Bright, former Health and Human Services deputy assistant secretary for preparedness and response: \u201cThis didn\u2019t have to be a nationwide outbreak, but there was .<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n And whoever\u2019s minding the store at the White House either cannot or will not whip the USDA into line:<\/p>\n Today, without nationwide surveillance or a clear understanding of the H5N1 outbreak\u2019s scope, \u201cwe are repeating every single mistake\u201d of the last pandemic, says Keith Poulsen, director of the Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. \u201cThe whole adage of \u2018don\u2019t take a test because we don\u2019t want to know what the answer is\u2019 is really irritating.\u201d<\/p>\n As one White House health official tells Vanity Fair, \u201cNot only have we not learned, we have regressed.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n So, at this point we are not sure how H5N1 is transmitted (fomites, aerosols, both? dairy lagoons<\/a>?), we have not mandated testing for cattle (except when they are moved between states, and even that doesn\u2019t work, as California herds were by cattle shipped to and from Idaho<\/a>). We have not mandated testing for dairy workers. USDA is slow-walking submitting H5N1 sequences to GISAID (USDA: 24 days; CDC: 8 days; Vietnam and Cambodia, faster than CDC). We have not mandated PPE on dairy farms. Private firms say that vaccines are ready, but they have not been approved. And so on[1]. Biden Administrations\u2019s H5N1 is a complete debacle, even stupider than Covid. Let \u2018er rip!<\/p>\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n Of course, one hesitates to say that election year politics had anything to do with Biden\u2019s second pandemic policy; we have no smoking memo<\/a>. We do have a tiny little indication from that portion of the Democrat hive mind buzzing at Daily Kos<\/a> (to lazy to crop out the dead cattle, but then again perhaps they make the point:<\/p>\n The \u201ctime out\u201d on H5N1 a few months ago, certainly seems odd. But apparently the Vanity Fair article shook something loose.<\/p>\n More centrally, the contradictions we might call the \u201cdual mandate\u201d of the Federal goverment \u2014 Preamble stuff like \u201cprovide for the general welfare\u201d vs. servicing capital (\u201cthe spice must flow\u201d) \u2014 occur not only for the H5N1 pandemic, but (arguably) generally.<\/p>\n For example, this famous episode, from NPR<\/a>, when Delta Airlines asked CDC to shorten the Covid isolation period from 10 days to five, and then-CDC Direction Rochelle Walensky rolled right over:<\/p>\n The CDC\u2019s decision comes days after Delta Air Lines\u2019 CEO sent Walensky a letter advocating for a shorter isolation period.<\/p>\n In the letter, CEO Ed Bastian \u2014 along with the airline\u2019s medical adviser and chief health officer \u2014 asks Walensky to consider shortening the isolation period to five days for those who experience a breakthrough infection.<\/p>\n \u201cWith the rapid spread of the Omicron variant, the 10-day isolation for those who are fully vaccinated may significantly impact our workforce and operations [profit],\u201d the Delta officials write.<\/p>\n The airline was among several in the U.S. that experienced thousands of cancellations over Christmas weekend, in part because airline staff were calling out sick with COVID-19.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n But that\u2019s not the only example. From Avian Flu Diary<\/a>:<\/p>\n Fifteen years ago, in Swine Flu: Don\u2019t Test, Don\u2019t Tell<\/a>, we looked at the reluctance of the swine industry to test pigs for novel flu viruses \u2013 fearing that bad publicity would cost them money<\/strong> \u2013 and the USDA\u2019s refusal to mandate testing.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Let \u2018er rip! There\u2019s money to be made!<\/p>\n\n
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