Yves here. Trump\u2019s puffery about Venezeula\u2019s acting president Delcy Rogriguez taking order from the US and Trump taking personal control of its oil is just another example of grandiosity, albeit with vastly more geopolitical collateral damage. So how much of a haircut should observers apply to Trump\u2019s deal claims? In some cases, like the Ukraine \u201craw earths\u201d pact, 100% might be appropriate.<\/p>\n
By Satyajit Das, a former banker and author of numerous technical works on derivatives and several general titles: Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives (2006 and 2010), Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (2011) and A Banquet of Consequence \u2013 Reloaded (2016 and 2021). His latest book is on ecotourism \u2013 Wild Quests: Journeys into Ecotourism and the Future for Animals (2024). This is an expanded version of a piece <\/em><\/strong>first published\u00a0on 1 January 2026 in the New Indian Express print edition<\/em><\/strong><\/a>.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n President Trump has popularised the idea of transactional approaches to everything. Yet, careful analysis suggests that his deal making prowess is questionable and grasp of the process deficient outside of scripted dealmaking on reality TV shows.<\/p>\n First, he frequently exceeds his executive powers<\/a>. Initiatives, such as tariffs and requiring chipmakers to give the US government 15 percent of revenues<\/a> from chip sales to China may not be legal. Foreign states may not be permitted to invest in the US as directed by President Trump with America getting a disproportionate share of profits.<\/p>\n He negotiates with parties who also lack the requisite authority. Outside of autocracies, deals with foreign leaders who have limited capacity to commit private actors, or which must be ratified by elected representatives are meaningless. EU President Ursula van der Lyden has limited ability<\/a> to commit members to any agreement which must usually be ratified by individual states. On commercial matters, private producers and purchasers, who will make the ultimate decision, are rarely represented.<\/p>\n On diplomatic matters, Trump intervenes arbitrarily. His peacemaking in the 2025 India-Pakistan border conflict was not welcomed by New Delhi<\/a>. In the Middle East, President Trump\u2019s plans agreed with Israel frequently ignore key parties like the Palestinians. A peace agreement with Moscow\/ Kyiv is unlikely to be accepted by Kyiv\/ Moscow (delete as requited) which is not party to discussions. It does not help that the key negotiators are not government officials<\/a> but the President\u2019s trusted and obsequious acolytes who are primarily opportunists seeking to profit from any agreement.<\/p>\n Second, with his well-known resistance to briefings<\/a>, President Trump\u2019s international relations deals discount historical, economic and cultural context. His real estate plans for the Gaza Riveria ignore the root causes of the conflict. President Putin\u2019s patient explication of the reasons underlying complex relations between the West and Russia would have been lost on Trump. Insulting Japan and China<\/a>, sensitive to past humiliations, misunderstands these nation\u2019s positions and their resistance to outside interference. Ignorance of China\u2019s near monopoly in rare earths, essential for defence and high-tech products, means the US is losing a war that it didn\u2019t even know that it was in.<\/p>\n Third, trade and investment treaties typically take time, sometimes years, to agree. President Trump\u2019s short attention span means his deals lack essential clarity and detail. They are rarely written agreements, discounting his insomniac, incoherent, self-aggrandising tweets. Given a telegenic, media savvy but administratively inept cabinet, bureaucrats, at least those who left after the Stalinist purges, must sort through multiple exclusions and side bargains to try to work out the terms. Commercial agreements, like sale of aircraft which has been championed by the President, are highly technical and frequently subject to options and changes. Many of the so-called deals may never be fully implemented.<\/p>\n Fourth, President Trump\u2019s deals are often mathematically impossible. Under their trade agreement, the EU has committed to purchase $250 billion of US energy products per annum for 3 years<\/a> but has little control over what energy private European companies import. It would also require redirection of most US energy exports, currently around $318 billion per annum in total, towards Europe. The EU would have to import two-thirds of all its energy needs from the US which lacks the production, refining and logistical capacity to supply this amount. It would also divert energy from the domestic market and could drive up US oil and gas prices. Europe would need to build the requisite infrastructure which is likely to take years.\u00a0 South Korea\u2019s $350 billion investment promise<\/a> would equal around 20 percent and 80 percent of its GDP and currency reserves respectively. It would require Korea to liquidate its reserves putting upward pressure on US interest or for the US to lend it the money via currency swap lines.<\/p>\n Boeing, whose aircraft President Trump has marketed aggressively, suffers from quality problems and production delays. Depending on the aircraft type and configuration, customers can expect a wait of upwards of 5 years for delivery<\/a> which can lengthen depending on labour and supply chain issues. In the defence sector, one commentator joked that under another Trump deal, Europe would be paying with money it did not have for weaponry which the US could not produce for Ukraine which did not have the manpower to deploy them.<\/p>\n Fifth, deals must be adhered to. Influenced by the last person to have his attention (dubbed Trump Proximity Theory), the President constantly renegotiates deals. His dismissive treatment of his own<\/em> US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement, and his tariff flip-flops are cases in point.<\/p>\n None of this should surprise as The Art of the Deal<\/em>, with its mix of flim-flam and make believe, foreshadows the current modus operandi. The basis for success, it argues, is thinking big, self-promotion with sensationalism and controversy, flexibility, playing to your strength and especially untruthful hyperbole. His biographer Gwenda Blair commented<\/a> on Trump\u2019s \u201ccontinuous self-inflation\u201d and thought the book was, in polite terms, an exaggeration. Tony Schwartz, his co-author although there are questions about the President\u2019s actual contribution to the book<\/a>, suggested that it should be treated as \u201cfiction\u201d in the light of the Trump enterprises\u2019 indifferent financial performance.<\/p>\n President Trump\u2019s deals are best understood as mechanisms to exert power, extort tributes, and gain media coverage. This means that tariffs, capital and currency measures and diplomatic initiatives will continue to change without any stable end state achieved. Agreements will be renegotiated constantly at the President\u2019s whim based on economic, political, or personal concerns at any given time.<\/p>\n President Trump\u2019s pathological need and demand that he wins big every time runs contrary to the reality that the only lasting deals are ones where both sides see lasting benefit in it. This means that the President must coerce or intimidate opponents to reach agreements. His coercive power over Canada and Mexico rely on their proximity, economic and security dependence on America. He can use Europe and Japan\u2019s military weakness and fear of foreign aggressors to reach deals which cast them as vassal states. But it means that the only deals achievable are with weak parties who must agree at least until they find a work-around, such as alternative markets and suppliers or, in the case of Europe and Japan, building up their own defence capabilities. In contrast, the approach is less successful with powerful counterparties such as China and Russia, who hold better cards.<\/p>\n
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